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Abstract 
Purpose 
This chapter engages critically with the ideas of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Irresponsibility 
(CSI) in order to examine their utility for the purposes of realizing more socially just and environmentally 
sustainable social and economic practices. 
Methodology/approach 
The chapter develops Marx’s understanding of the twin pressures of class struggle and inter-capitalist 
competition in setting the limits of agency for corporate actors.  It is thus theoretical and discursive in nature. 
Findings 
The findings of the chapter suggest that the scope for corporate agency in relation to 
responsibility/irresponsibility are severely limited by inter-capitalist competition and capitalist social relations.  
It therefore argues that those interested in social justice and environmental sustainability should focus on these 
structural pressures rather than theorizing corporate agency. 
Social implications 
The research suggests that the focus of academic and government attention should be on resolving the 
contradictions and exploitative social relations inherent in capitalism.  Without this emphasis activism, corporate 
agency and government action will not eradicate the types of problem that advocates of CSR/I are concerned 
about. 
Originality/value of paper 
The value of the paper is that it contests and engages critically with the utility of the notion of CSR and the 
emergent concept of CSI. It asks proponents of these concepts to think seriously about the structural pressures 
and constraints within which business and policy makers act. 
 
Interest in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has grown markedly over recent decades 
and more recently still has been accompanied by a concern with Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility (CSI).  This is not just an academic interest but a practical and policy matter 
too.  In a world of complex social problems, in which the dominant political and economic 
values suggest that the state and its agencies should promote free market capitalism, CSR 
apparently offers the potential for states to absolve themselves of policy responsibility while 
ensuring that public and social goods are privately produced.  However, in the wake of the 
financial crisis that emerged from 2007/8 onwards there is increasing concern that CSR has 
failed to live up to its potential.  CSI suggests that problematic behavior among some firms 
can be explained as the result of agency on the part of individuals and corporations. 
Understanding it in this way suggests that there is the potential for policy measures to ‘design 
out’ irresponsibility and maximize responsibility through legislation or soft-governance. It 
also implies that firms are in a position to choose the extent to which they act ‘responsibly’.  
These are laudable aims, but this chapter argues that the degree of agency available to firms 
is in fact severely constrained by the structural features of global capitalism.  It draws 
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attention to the role of inter-capitalist competition and social struggle in determining the 
limits of corporate agency in this regard.  The implication of this analysis is that attention is 
more usefully focused at the system level rather than the level of individual corporate actors. 
By shifting attention to structural constraints in capitalism, the incentives and motivations for 
firms attempting strategies of CSR or being accused of CSI might also be understood 
differently.  First, it suggests that a significant degree of ‘irresponsible’ behavior will always 
exist, regardless of the handwringing of politicians or academics.  That doesn’t rule out 
socially altruistic or ‘responsible’ behavior on the part of corporate actors.  Indeed, there are 
several very specific conditions in which this type of behavior is likely to be realized.  The 
problem is that, for the most part, these are associated either with competitive strategies or 
with circumstances that are harmful to the continuity of capitalism as a social system. 
The chapter re-articulates the concept of ‘CSR’ as Capitalist Social Responsibility, showing 
how this is a much more productive analytical tool for understanding what is really at work 
when considering corporate ‘responsibility’ or ‘irresponsibility’.  Here Capitalist Social 
Responsibility refers not to the pursuit of ‘social’ goals per se, but of widely shared class-
goals which reflect the common interest of the capitalist class, or at least significant sub-
sections of it.  In some places, and at some times, these will look like they align with the 
interests of other social groups, but ultimately this always masks (and most often further 
entrenches) competitive strategies and/or exploitative social relations. 
In this context, irresponsibility can also be understood differently.  In the first instance, 
irresponsibility should be understood as behavior which transgresses the bounds of the social 
norms of capitalist production.  Ofcourse these norms are not the same across either time or 
space; so what was acceptable in 19th Century London is not in 21st Century London and is 
different again from 21st Century Shanghai.  Competition, especially at the margins, will 
always push individuals and firms to push the bounds of those norms, and sometimes exceed 
them.  This is irresponsible in another sense though; in the sense of Capitalist Social 
Irresponsibility.  Here transgressing the social norms of capitalism in a particular place is 
‘irresponsible’ in class terms because it threatens to undermine capitalist legitimacy. 
Finally, the chapter argues that the concept of CSI can be put to powerful political use.  
However, for this power to be realized it needs to be placed in the context of the structural 
analysis set out below.  When this is in place, CSI could be seen as one component of a wider 
social struggle to rearticulate social relations in ways that are supportive of principles of 
equality, social justice and sustainability.   
The Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility and the persistent problem 
of Irresponsibility 
CSR has attracted much attention since its emergence in the 1950s (e.g. Bowen 1953; Davis 
1960; Carroll 1999). Dominant themes in the literature include moral arguments about the 
responsibility that accompanies power and influence and the alignment between business and 
the dominant values of the society in which it operates.  This alignment is important because 
it reflects the socially acceptable trade-off between the production of private and social goods 
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at any one point in time and space. This is frequently expressed as a rather mechanistic 
concern that business operates within the law (Carroll 1979b); which is, itself the socially 
constructed codification of the social relations of capitalism. In an age of transnational 
production this has led to an extended concern, driven in part by consumer and shareholder 
activism, that the standards expected in one part of a business operation are upheld 
throughout, regardless of whether formal legal obligations assert this (Hudson and Hudson 
2003; Hale 2008).  Others draw attention to the importance of business producing the goods 
and services that society wants and sustaining this through profits (Carroll 1979a; Matten and 
Moon 2008), with still others suggesting that the prospect for diluting this makes CSR a 
“fundamentally subversive doctrine” (Friedman 1970). Drucker sought to move beyond the 
apparent tension between social and private responsibility here by suggesting that they are 
compatible to the extent that business is not only able to reconcile social responsibilities with 
profit seeking, but also to turn the provision of social goods into profit seeking opportunities 
(Drucker 1984).  Despite repeated attempts however, it is not entirely clear that contemporary 
writing on CSR has fully resolved some of the tensions inherent in these various definitions 
(Dahlsrud 2008; Matten and Moon 2008).   
Nevertheless the promise of CSR is so attractive because it appears to offer one means by 
which complex social problems might be addressed in an era of globalization where the 
capacity of the state to do this alone is routinely questioned (Rosenau 1995; Rosenau 2002).  
CSR is seen as one mechanism by which a range of different actors can be engaged in a 
network of organizations helping to deal with complex problems such as service delivery, 
poverty alleviation or combating environmental problems.  There are prominent examples of 
this at both global and national level (Ruggie 2004; Cameron 2011).   
For their part, firms have been keen to adopt the CSR mantra for a variety of reasons, 
including consumer and shareholder activism.  In the 1990s and 2000s concern with the 
exploitative production practices adopted by the decentralized suppliers of Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) motivated several high profile activist campaigns to boycott particular 
brands.  Acting first to defend themselves from direct criticism, or the potential for it, several 
high profile MNCs adopted labour codes of conduct and other statements of CSR. Firms 
quickly realized that the value embedded in brand fetishism could be exploited by adopting 
and promoting their CSR credentials and therefore CSR became a part of the competitive 
strategies of an increasing number of corporations (Hudson and Hudson 2003; Yu 2008; 
Taylor 2011).   
If CSR exists at one end of a spectrum however, at the other end must exist Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility (CSI) (Jones et al. 2009; Jones 2010; Clark and Grantham 2012).  It is 
claimed that CSI can help to recognize that business is not always ‘responsible’ and also to 
theoretically account for that empirical reality.  In the context of the financial crisis: dubious 
lending practices; clearly negative social externalities from practices such as short-selling in 
the financial markets, tax avoidance and the current scandal engulfing News International1, it 
seems as if the concept of CSI might have found its time.  CSI apparently offers the promise 
of naming and shaming corporate actors to adopt more ethical, socially just and 
environmentally sustainable behavior (Clark and Grantham 2012; Taylor 2012). 
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A focus on corporate irresponsibility as well as responsibility might be said to appeal more to 
critics of capitalism and there are several notable examples in the literature (Chatterji and 
Listokin 2007; Banerjee 2008; Shaw 2009).  Shaw (2009) attempts to unify the study of 
business ethics with Marxist critiques of capitalism.  However, his argument demonstrates an 
inadequate understanding of Marx’s critique and specifically he equates Marx’s identification 
of the structural pressures of capitalism (though Shaw, rather tellingly, fails to spell out his 
understanding of these) with the rather different assertion that this must mean that there are 
no ethics in business.  His failure to fully develop Marx’s analysis of the structural features of 
capitalist development leads him to erroneous conclusions, not just about the nature of 
Marx’s critique but also about the scope for corporate and individual agency.  By caricaturing 
Marx, Shaw is able to claim that the empirical observation that corporate actors often do 
adopt ethical codes of conduct disproves the Marxist case, though as the discussion below 
suggests, this is not the case.  Chaterji and Listokin (2007) present a rather a-theoretical 
argument that advocates of CSR simply overstate the scope to persuade rather than force 
corporate actors to modify their behavior to take into account social and environmental 
concerns.  For his part, Banerjee (2008) develops Foucault’s analysis of the structural power 
of discursive knowledge to present a largely successful critique of CSR as at best misplaced 
optimism and at worst legitimation of capitalist exploitation.  However, his analysis would be 
considerably strengthened by linking it to an understanding of inter-capitalist competition and 
capitalist social relations. 
This chapter seeks to go beyond these existing critiques by demonstrating the relationship of 
CSR to Marx’s analysis of capitalist competition and social relations.  In doing so it advances 
the arguments of those who are skeptical about the prospects of CSR to realize more socially 
and environmentally just outcomes.  It also therefore appraises the utility of the emerging 
concept of CSI, and suggests that its proponents need to take seriously the structural 
constraints of capitalism. The first section starts with a brief summary of Marx’s critique of 
capitalism before outlining the role of inter-capitalist competition as a precursor to 
identifying the implications that this has for understanding CSR and CSI. 
Capitalist Social Relations 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism is based on the premise that the key feature of any mode of 
production is the social relations between individuals and social groups that it generates. In a 
capitalist society a particular form of social relations are produced between those who must 
sell their labor power to survive and reproduce themselves in ‘every day’ life and 
generationally (i.e. the working class) and those who own or control the means of production 
(i.e. the bourgeoisie or capitalists) and therefore purchase the labor power of the working 
class (Wood 1995: 31-6).  At the heart of capitalist social relations is a process of class 
struggle and inter-capitalist competition, rather than one of free agency on the part of either 
seller or purchaser (Wood 2002: 96-8; Morton 2006: 63-5). 
Value is generated from the application of labor power in the production process.  The 
amount of labor power embodied in the production of a commodity determines its ultimate 
value, though confusingly this does not always equal its price. The price of a commodity may 
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fluctuate due to conditions of demand and supply, but once these are stripped away the 
‘equilibrium’ price will reveal the value of the ‘socially-necessary’ average labor time 
embodied in its production (Marx 1867: Ch19).  ‘Socially-necessary’ here is crucial to 
understanding the role of labor-time in generating value because it introduces the notion of 
both abstract average labor (i.e. excluding the variation in productivity, skill and speed of 
individual workers) and the idea that what is ‘necessary’ is not a given, but is socially 
constructed in any one place or time by a complex range of cultural, social and material 
factors. The socially necessary labor time embodied, for instance, in the production of a car 
will vary over time and space to reflect the balance of social relations between capital and 
labor, social and legal norms about working hours and conditions, the level of technology 
applied, socially acceptable standards of living, the degree of sophistication of the car as an 
end product and so on.   
Ofcourse there are other determinants of the degree of surplus value generation.  Marx is 
famous for the line in the Communist Manifesto that all history is “…the history of class 
struggles” (Marx and Engels 1848: Ch1).  One of the ways in which the distribution of 
surpluses can be shaped is through the balance of power in the social relations between 
capital and labor in any particular place (country/region etc), economic sector and time.  
Social struggles, industrial relations and the like are therefore part of the process of 
determining how much surplus is generated (e.g. the pace and intensity of work, the amount 
of labor power employed and the technology used in production) and who it is distributed to 
(e.g. wages, profits and taxes).  In most capitalist countries strong legal statutes limit the 
scope of these struggles from being social and political to the atomized enterprise-level of 
industrial relations.  Again the extent to which this is achieved is dependent on the nature and 
dynamics (and therefore path dependency) of class struggle in any one particular place at a 
point in time.  Historically rooted social struggles between capital and labour, often 
articulated through the state, will lead to a particular manifestation of those relations (Marx 
and Engels 1848: Ch1). Some of these norms will become codified in legal statute while 
others will be more implicit and customary.  
The employment of the labor power of the working class results in the production of ‘surplus 
value’ that accrues to the capitalist.  The capitalist can opt to increase surplus value by 
increasing the amount of labor power employed by increasing the number of workers 
employed or lengthening the working day (absolute surplus value). Alternatively, they can 
increase it by reorganizing production to make it more productive, through innovations in the 
organization or technology of production (relative surplus value) (Marx 1867: Ch16).  To this 
extent the degree of surplus value generated by capitalist enterprises as profits is dependent 
on a combination of class struggle and management strategies. 
The role of wages in determining surplus value is also connected to a range of factors 
associated with capitalist social relations but which are exogenous to the industrial relations 
of individual enterprises.  For example, one of the determinants of wages is the cost of the 
reproduction of labor power (Marx 1867: Ch12, 19).  If costs of living increase then wages 
must also rise to enable labor power to be reproduced and surplus generation to continue.  
Conversely, if the cost of living falls then wages can also fall; and the proportion of the 
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working day that is spent generating output to cover the costs of reproducing labor power can 
be reduced.  Consequently a greater part of the time that labor power is employed can be 
devoted to generating surplus value.  In this sense all capitalists benefit from innovations 
which result in reductions in the costs of reproducing labor power.  Innovation then provides 
not just a private and excludable good for one capitalist but a social good for all, so long as it 
relates to products consumed in the regeneration of labour power.  As we shall see below, this 
introduces one way in which ‘social responsibility’ might be seen under capitalism in quite 
different terms to the CSR literature. 
Inter-Capitalist Competition 
Alongside class struggle, inter-capitalist competition is also a key structural feature of 
capitalist social relations.  So far we have only shown how innovation and organizational 
change impact on the general or average rate of surplus value in any particular sector.  
However, ofcourse the enterprise or firm which implements successful innovations has an 
advantage over its competitors.  This is because products trade at the average price.  As such, 
those firms that can take advantage of successful innovations can gain additional relative 
surplus value compared with their competitors. 
“The real value of a commodity is, however, not its individual value but its social value; that 
is to say, the real value is not measured by the labor-time socially required for its production.  
If therefore, the capitalist who applies the new method sells his commodity at its social value 
of one shilling, he sells it for threepence above its individual value, and thus realizes an extra 
surplus-vale of threepence.” (Marx 1867: Ch12).  
This can generate advantages in several ways: firms with this competitive form of surplus 
value will find it easier to generate additional investment; they may choose to share the 
benefits of the additional relative surplus value with key workers, thereby attracting the best 
talent and enhancing future productivity; or they may choose also to increase market share by 
foregoing some of the increase in additional relative surplus value by lowering their prices 
below the average rate; and finally they may choose to reinvest part of the additional surplus 
value in further product or process innovations. 
Without responding to these kinds of innovations, it is easy to see that other firms in the same 
market will quickly go out of business.  Therefore, they are spurred either to replicate or leap-
frog these innovations in their own processes.  As such, the additional relative surplus value 
that is generated by innovations in the organization and technology of production in a single 
firm is short-lived: 
“…this extra surplus-value vanishes, so soon as the new method of production has become 
general, and has consequently caused the difference between the individual value of the 
cheapened commodity and its social value to vanish.  The law of the determination of value 
by labor-time, a law which brings under its determination the individual capitalist who 
applies the new method of production, by compelling him to sell his goods under their social 
value, this same law, acting as coercive law of competition, forces his competitors to adopt 
the new method” (Marx 1867: Ch12). 
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Inter-capitalist competition provides the role of explaining why individual capitalists and 
their cadre’s are so concerned with these sorts of organizational and technological 
innovations.  Incidentally it also means that innovation is in fact risky.  It is not always bound 
to be successful.  Even successful ideas can fail due to poor implementation.  It is this that 
leads to the recognition of the importance of ‘soft skills’ and the cult of ‘leadership’ in 
ensuring that the implementation of innovation and change are widely supported in the 
workforce so that they have a better chance of success.  It also explains the emphasis in 
economic development policy in virtually all countries on the role of competition, innovation, 
risk taking and entrepreneurship: all are absolutely central to a capitalist economy (Cammack 
2006; Cammack 2008).  Without them, growth stalls and crisis emerges. Indeed they are so 
central that the balance of social struggle, codified in legal statute, is frequently such that 
corporations are legally compelled to follow the imperative of competition. The famous 1919 
ruling against Henry Ford’s plans to subsume the short-term profit motive under longer-term 
plans for embedding a particular industrial and social model demonstrate this point ably 
(Banerjee 2008: pp58-59). 
These laws of competition do not just generate innovation but also expansion.  Unless a 
capitalist, faced by competition, acts to expand the scale of their production, then others will 
do so and drive them out of business.  Competition drives expansion in the commodification 
of labor power, use of raw materials and fixed capital – itself the product of expansionary 
competitive pressures.  As such, a pre-occupation with growth is in-built to capitalism as a 
social system. 
There are, though, important problems associated with this pattern of expansion and 
competitive innovation. The generation of surpluses, and the ability of capitalists to capture 
these as profits, tends toward the polarization of society with increasing amounts of surpluses 
accruing at one end and increasing amounts of un- or under-employed labor power at the 
other (Marx 1894: Ch13; Harvey 1982: 195).  Inter-capitalist competition also generates a 
pressure toward centralization in the credit system and sectoral monopolies as some firms are 
successful at producing innovations which generate competitive advantage and are therefore 
able to exclude their competitors from the market.  
These problems can be offset, for a time.  Surpluses can be invested in increasing the scope 
of capitalist production – such as by investing in production in areas of the world economy 
that were previously outside of capitalist social relations (part of what we currently call 
‘globalization’).  This is what might be called a spatial strategy of offsetting over-
accumulation.  Temporal strategies involve the ‘sinking’ of surpluses into long-term fixed 
investments, usually in infrastructure but sometimes also fixed capital investment (Harvey 
1982; Harvey 2003: 109-121).   
Both temporal and spatial strategies involve further expansion however, and involve ever 
greater consumption of economic, social and environmental resources and narrowing the 
scope for future expansion; delaying but not eradicating the onset of crisis.  Periodic crises of 
over-accumulation, including the emergence of speculative bubbles, devaluation and the 
resulting social and political upheaval, are an inbuilt component of capitalist development.  
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So too, expansion clearly has bi-products: for example the globalization of capitalist social 
relations, resource depletion, ecological and environmental degradation.  In short, capital 
comes up against limitations in its social relations and also its relationship to the natural 
world which can be offset for a time, but not for ever.   
The Limits to Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of Political 
Agency 
The role of competition in capitalist development places strict limits on the extent of CSR 
and shapes the way in which we should understand examples of socially ‘responsible’ and 
‘irresponsible’ behavior on the part of corporate actors.  Inter-capitalist competition means 
that a successful capitalist enterprise must constantly redirect the surplus value it generates 
into investments which will increase its future productivity.  This means cutting costs, 
increasing productivity and expanding production.  This naturally places limits on the extent 
to which any firm in a competitive market can redirect its focus away from profit 
maximisation. 
Ofcourse this does not eliminate the possibility of ‘socially responsible’ behavior entirely.  
Strategically well positioned managers might exploit the autonomy afforded to them to 
pursue their own personal altruistic interests by sponsoring local sports teams, implementing 
pro-bono work schemes or giving charitable donations to local causes.  The scale, reach and 
extent of these activities will clearly depend on the scale of their organization and their 
position in the hierarchy. Relatively lowly managers may pursue these objectives at a local 
level, high-level managers in nationally significant industries may launch nationally 
significant initiatives. Likewise, businesses may pursue ‘socially responsible’ activity as a 
means to promote their image or increase their sales, in the way suggested by the ‘business 
case’ emphasis in the CSR literature.   
Both these examples though are clearly constrained in terms of the extent to which CSR can 
really take hold in a capitalist economy.  They rely on either exceptions to the norms of 
capitalist competition or the subsumption of the idea of social responsibility under the real 
objective of competitiveness (the Drucker-Friedman logic).   
The first example – the altruistic and opportunistic individual – is in fact the perversion of the 
normal objectives of a capitalist enterprise.  If the scale of that activity got too large the 
individual firm would succumb to the pressures of capitalist competition. The examples of 
Ben and Jerry’s; Body Shop; and Green and Blacks are all illustrative here, having initially 
forged a competitive niche on the basis of the value added to their brand by their socially 
responsible image they have subsequently been swallowed up by larger more profit-seeking 
competitors. If socially responsible activity got too widespread, thereby alleviating the impact 
on the competitive pressures facing the individual firm, capitalism itself would slow down 
and start to atrophy – just the concern that led Friedman (1970) to be so vituperative in his 
critique of CSR.   
Clearly, CSR activity and the autonomy to pursue it might expand where an individual firm 
faces less competitive pressure in the first place – i.e. in a monopoly situation.  But once 
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again, this is both an exception to the normative values2 of capitalism and a serious problem 
for the health of capitalism as a social system. The empirical evidence about the impact of 
monopolies also tells us that they are as least as likely to use that position for their own gain 
as they are for wider social good.  There appear at least as many robber-barons as there are 
philanthropists. Indeed, sometimes the two go together and the social objectives of 
philanthropists can at times be seriously questioned. 
The second example of how socially responsible activity might blossom is more in line with 
the normal operation of capitalism both at the firm and at the social level.  Many firms have 
in fact attempted to engage with CSR as a means of embellishing their brand image with 
additional value by appealing to the ethical concerns of consumers.  However, this is not in 
fact CSR at all but a carefully implemented strategy to enhance firm competitiveness while 
offsetting consumer or investor critique by appearing to abide by codes of responsible 
behavior (Chatterji and Listokin 2007).  This doesn’t mean that ‘social benefit’ is absent. 
However, to label competitive strategy as driven by social rather than private gains is simply 
to misunderstand the motivation at play.  Moreover, careful empirical work on CSR, for 
example in the adoption of labour codes of conduct in transnational supply chains, shows 
how they can be used to maintain uneven geographical development by catching suppliers 
between twin pressures of compliance with codes of conduct and maintaining cost 
competition. The outcome is to maintain unequal power relations between western consumer 
brands and their low-value added manufacturing suppliers in the developing world, while at 
the same time meaning that many of those suppliers actually invest heavily in strategies of 
minimal compliance, evasion and falsification (Taylor 2011).  It might be tempting to see this 
as merely irresponsible behavior on the part of individual firms but that would be to 
misunderstand the structural pressures at work. 
Capitalist Social Responsibility 
These structural constraints on corporate agency also suggest that the idea of the social 
responsibilities of capitalists might be cast in a rather different light: as the shared 
responsibilities of capitalists as a social class.  First, competition and innovation are essential 
shared responsibilities of all capitalists.  As we have seen; without them growth stalls and 
crises emerge.  Rather paradoxically, a Marxist analysis suggests that Friedman is right – the 
imperative to compete is the first responsibility of capitalists.   
Second, since capitalist growth is dependent on the unequal and exploitative nature of the 
production of surplus value it is dependent on obscuring and securing this class-relation.  The 
next shared responsibility of capitalists, it follows, is to sustain this class relation through a 
combination of material and ideological action to obscure the exploitative character of 
capitalist social relations (Banerjee 2008).  
Both these, and additional (see below), elements of capitalist responsibility are sometimes 
difficult to realize through individual corporate agency.  As such, the social interests of 
capital as a class are often pursued through collective institutions.  Membership and 
representative groups are one means of achieving this, but the modern state was founded on 
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through the requirement to assert the class interests of capital.  It simultaneously embodies 
the codification of private property rights (in legal codes), the development of the coercive 
capacity (jurisprudence and policing) (Gill 1998) to uphold these and the ideological capacity 
to defend and justify these as natural (through a variety of means, including control of the 
education system (Gramsci 1971: 3-43).  Whether the state is captured by the capitalist class 
or sub-sections of it or is able to exercise ‘relative autonomy’ is largely defined by the 
balance of class struggle and the nature of inter-capitalist competition (Poulantzas 2000). 
A final element of capitalist responsibility lays in offsetting crisis tendencies.  Crisis 
tendencies in capitalist development are many-fold.  They include the agglomeration of 
capital such that it is hoarded and can no longer find profitable investment opportunities 
(over-accumulation crises) (Marx 1867:762-94; Marx 1894: 359-68, Ch13), the extension of 
workplace discipline to such an extent that workers are no longer able to purchase final 
consumer goods (under-consumption crises) (Baran et al. 1966; Luxemburg 2003) or to re-
generate their labour power on a daily or inter-generational basis (reproduction crises) (Gill 
2003) and problems in the sequence of demand for goods between different parts of the 
economy such that inventories build up, credit markets seize up or cash-flow problems 
emerge (disproportionality) (Clarke 1990; Clarke 1994).  To these might be added a further 
category of crisis tendencies associated with negative environmental externalities and 
resource depletion (ecological and raw materials crises).  Capitalists and their collective 
agencies thus have a responsibility to offset these.  Again the primary agent of such offsetting 
is the state and other public agencies.  Historical examples of the state playing these roles 
include the regulation of externalities, the creation of welfare states to assist with social 
reproduction or offsetting over-accumulation by investing a portion of the surplus value taken 
in taxes or lending to the state in long-term projects which only release their productivity 
benefits over the long-term (e.g. housing and infrastructure projects) (Harvey 1982:427; 
Harvey 2003: pp109-11).  But individual capitalists often undertake these roles also, 
particularly where the balance of social relations leads to a weak state infrastructure.  This is 
part of the explanation for example for the large philanthropic foundations in the United 
States and their role in offsetting crisis tendencies by providing public goods. 
What prospects for the concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility 
The purpose of this volume is to put forward and elaborate the concept of CSI as an 
alternative analytical and political tool for the realization of progressive social change.  This 
is motivated by a recognition that CSR has failed to motivate the degree of change in 
business practices that many of its proponents would like to see.  The discussion above shows 
why CSR has failed: its proponents and academic discussants, ironically save for Milton 
Friedman, never recognized the severe constraints that hem-in corporate agency.   
CSI is a relatively recent concept and begins from the premise that there is a spectrum of 
capitalist agency ranging from the socially responsible at one end to the illegal and 
irresponsible at the other.  Rather than exhort those in the middle of this distribution to ape 
those at the most virtuous end of the spectrum, the argument is that naming and shaming 
those at the irresponsible end of the spectrum might have more persuasive power and 
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likelihood of realizing increased social benefit.  In this spectrum CSI is shown as spanning 
the boundary between legal and illegal practice, and the suggestion is that at least part of 
what ought to be defined as irresponsible is behavior that falls short of being illegal but is 
either against the ‘spirit’ of the law or is widely regarded as unethical and in as much might 
become illegal in the future.  Here the example of tax avoidance (not illegal but about 
exploiting loopholes and weaknesses in tax law) is illustrative of irresponsible behavior.  So 
too is the exploitation of negative externalities (pollution etc) for competitive advantage 
(Clark and Grantham 2012).   
In one sense the idea of CSI is appealing in that it is rather like motherhood and apple pie: 
there is little scope to be against it. Who could be against working to reduce illegal or 
blatantly exploitative business practices with substantial negative externalities?  To that 
extent then it is clear that it should be supported.  However, the discussion above suggests 
that proponents of CSI need to bear in mind a series of important features of capitalist growth 
that will shape their success in shifting the ‘equivocal zone’ of behavior to realize progressive 
social and economic change. 
First, proponents of CSI need to remember that capitalism per se is an exploitative social 
system.  Sure it is true that some business practices are more exploitative than others, but the 
production of surplus value is essentially an exploitative process and therefore even the most 
‘virtuous’ business practice is of questionable morality.  Marx famously elaborates this in 
relation to the genesis of capital in the first instance – i.e. the accumulation of a mass of 
money commodities for investment requires unjustifiable dispossession as an a priori 
condition.  Historically, this process was bloody and violent (Marx 1867: Ch26-33) and still 
continues today (Harvey 2003).  Second, since surplus value comes from labour power, it 
belongs to those whose labour is used in its creation.  The argument that capitalists as a social 
class are owed a portion of this because of their initial investment is not just dismissed on the 
grounds of the original dispossession but because the consumption of surplus value in the 
form of profits effectively writes off the initial investment: 
“If a capital of £1,000 beget yearly a surplus value of £200, and if this surplus value be 
consumed every year, it is clear that at the end of 5 years the surplus value consumed will 
amount to 5 × £200 or the £1,000 originally advanced. If only a part, say one half, were 
consumed, the same result would follow at the end of 10 years, since 10 × £100= 
£1,000…the capitalist; when he has consumed the equivalent of his original capital, the value 
of his present capital represents nothing but the total amount of the surplus value 
appropriated by him without payment. Not a single atom of the value of his old capital 
continues to exist.” (Marx 1867: 396). 
Second, in capitalism there are both universal and specific elements to the ‘business ethic’.  
Capitalism always requires a business ethic that supports and upholds contracts and 
agreements, praises and rewards a certain degree of integrity and suggests to workers that 
personal responsibility (a large part of what are currently defined as employability skills – see 
(Nunn et al. 2009)) is essential to support their success in selling their labor power. However, 
the precise nature of these obligations will vary over time and space according to the contours 
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of class struggle and inter-capitalist competition.  For example, at one place and time the 
balance of inter-capitalist and capitalist-working class social relations may support child 
labor, sweat shops and environmental degradation, and the predominant business ethic will 
support, justify and regulate the norms of interaction around this. In another context an 
emphasis on financial services and high value-added production would lead to a relevant but 
different business ethic. In yet another social context the predominant business ethic will 
support long-term manufacturing, through fostering long-term relationships between 
manufacturing and finance capital and stable relationships with large-scale organized labor.  
Varieties in capitalist social relations therefore explain variation in the predominant business 
ethic. 
While it is not surprising that for the most part corporate actors will try to live within the law 
and the business ethic, the competitive pressures at work mean that there will always be 
examples of firms and managers that live at the edge of these: toward the left hand side of 
Clark and Grantham’s spectrum. As such, capitalist ‘irresponsibility’ is to be expected – it is 
the product of inter-capitalist competition and the search for advantage at the margins of 
‘acceptable’ competitive strategy.  Just as players in a game push the limits of rules and 
norms and occasionally transgress them, so too it is to be expected that inter-capitalist 
competition will lead to similar behaviors.  Further, just as sports players will often go 
furthest in this transgression when not in the normal field of play where it is least visible (by 
using performance enhancing drugs in private, for example), then so too it is to be expected 
that corporate actors will be more likely to transgress social norms when outside of the most 
visible arena in which they do business.  
This irresponsibility at the individual level has system-level implications.  Just as Capitalist 
Social Responsibility may manifest itself in actions designed to secure and embed capitalism 
as a social system, irresponsible behavior can be seen in some contexts to undermine its 
legitimacy.  Transgressions of the law or the rules and norms of capitalist behavior can 
occasionally undermine the legitimacy of business and capitalism more broadly.  Political 
agency here is clearly important because such transgressions take place within the context of 
both inter-capitalist competition and class-based social struggle.  As such, some capitalists 
will seek to use irresponsible behavior by others as a means to secure their own position; 
perhaps by promoting legislation or similar to harm competitors.   
This suggests several important considerations for the proponents of CSI.  It certainly 
suggests that CSI is a more appropriate focus than is CSR on the grounds that it avoids falling 
into the trap of simply supporting the competitive strategy of some firms over others or 
endorsing superficial window dressing activities which have little or no purchase in reality.  It 
might also form one part of a political strategy to identify symbolically powerful examples of 
exploitative or unsustainable practice as a means of building support for a progressive 
transformation of social relations.  Indeed, it is just such a ‘war of position’ that Gramsci 
advocated as a means of bringing about progressive social change (Gramsci 1971).  Such a 
strategy requires scrutiny of CSI to be part of a political movement as well as an abstract 
academic concept. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter shows how inter-capitalist competition and capitalist social relations drive and 
constrain the agency of individual corporate actors to act ‘responsibly’ or ‘irresponsibly’.  
These limitations are important because policy makers at the local, national and even global 
level hope that CSR offers one means of overcoming the constraints that they themselves 
have placed on the ability of states to solve the complex problems they face in a world of 
globalization.  So too, they appeal to rules, norms and incentives in the hope of eradicating 
irresponsible behavior on the part of capitalists.   
The limitations on corporate agency generated by inter-capitalist competition and class 
struggle arise from the need to constantly redirect corporate resources into innovation and to 
suppress the claims of the working class to realize increases in relative surplus value.  These 
pressures do not eliminate the possibility of ‘socially responsible’ behavior, but they do 
ensure that it can only emerge in very specific circumstances.  Put simply, it is just not 
possible for CSR to resolve the systemic social and environmental problems generated by 
capitalism itself.  Where it does come to the fore it is usually because there is a fit between 
some sort of social objective (often superficially pursued) and the profit motive. In these 
cases though, this is just the pursuit of a market niche, brand value or sectional interests 
within capitalism. In such instances this is simply the normal operation of structural pressures 
toward competition.  It thus follows that there is no need to invent concepts like CSR to 
describe or understand it. Indeed, doing so may lead to significant misunderstanding. 
With these considerations in place, we can think of a different meaning for CSR – as 
Capitalist Social Responsibility.  Capitalist Social Responsibility focuses attention on the 
objectives capitalists must pursue if they are to be successful individually and if capitalism is 
to flourish.  These competitive pressures reveal a positive relationship between the private 
gains associated with competition and the social gains of capitalists as a class.  This is 
manifest in multiple ways from the general pursuit of competitiveness (alá Friedman) to the 
imposition of discipline on society in general.  The common theme that unites the different 
aspects of Capitalist Social Responsibility is the pursuit of the general interests of the 
capitalist class or its subsections, rather than the interests of society more generally.  In this 
context CSI might also be understood in a specific way: as behavior which transgresses the 
social norms associated with capitalism in any particular context.  Such transgressions should 
be expected as the product of the pressures generated by inter-capitalist competition, but in 
certain contexts they can undermine the legitimacy of capitalism as a social system, or at least 
variants of it.    
Academic attempts to identify and expose CSI need to bear in mind the structural limits to the 
role of corporate agency in achieving progressive change.  Attention needs to be focused on 
the socially and environmentally exploitative nature of capitalist social relations.  But with 
that consideration in place, CSI could usefully form part of a broader based political project 
to identify and expose exploitation in an effort to transform those social relations.   
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1 At the time of writing this chapter in July 2011, News International was engulfed in criminal and 
parliamentary inquiries into the role of major Newspapers in tapping the phones of prominent politicians, 
celebrities and victims of crime.  The scandal associated with this followed the line that journalists and editors 
responsible for this had acted irresponsibly and in so doing had led to a crisis of legitimacy in the privately 
owned print-media and the political influence of news organisations like News International. 
2 It is a subversion of the rhetorical ideal of capitalism – but as Marx comprehensively shows there are distinct 
and powerful pressures toward both centralisation and monopoly present in capitalist development.  
Unfortunately a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
